CamFlow: Managed Data-sharing for Cloud Services by Pasquier, Thomas F. J. -M. et al.
1CamFlow: Managed data-sharing
for cloud services
Thomas F. J.-M. Pasquier, Member, IEEE, Jatinder Singh, Member, IEEE, David Eyers, Member, IEEE
and Jean Bacon Fellow, IEEE,
Abstract—A model of cloud services is emerging whereby a few trusted providers manage the underlying hardware and communica-
tions whereas many companies build on this infrastructure to offer higher level, cloud-hosted PaaS services and/or SaaS applications.
From the start, strong isolation between cloud tenants was seen to be of paramount importance, provided first by virtual machines (VM)
and later by containers, which share the operating system (OS) kernel. Increasingly it is the case that applications also require facilities
to effect isolation and protection of data managed by those applications. They also require flexible data sharing with other applications,
often across the traditional cloud-isolation boundaries; for example, when government, consisting of different departments, provides
services to its citizens through a common platform.
These concerns relate to the management of data. Traditional access control is application and principal/role specific, applied at policy
enforcement points, after which there is no subsequent control over where data flows; a crucial issue once data has left its owner’s
control by cloud-hosted applications and within cloud-services. Information Flow Control (IFC), in addition, offers system-wide, end-to-
end, flow control based on the properties of the data. We discuss the potential of cloud-deployed IFC for enforcing owners’ data flow
policy with regard to protection and sharing, as well as safeguarding against malicious or buggy software. In addition, the audit log
associated with IFC provides transparency and offers system-wide visibility over data flows. This helps those responsible to meet their
data management obligations, providing evidence of compliance, and aids in the identification of policy errors and misconfigurations.
We present our IFC model and describe and evaluate our IFC architecture and implementation (CamFlow). This comprises an OS level
implementation of IFC with support for application management, together with an IFC-enabled middleware.
Index Terms—Compliance, Security, Audit, Cloud Computing, Information Flow Control, Middleware, PaaS
F
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
A MODEL of cloud services is emerging whereby afew trusted providers manage the underlying hard-
ware and communications infrastructure—datacenters
with worldwide replication to achieve high data in-
tegrity and availability at low latency. Many compa-
nies build on this infrastructure to offer higher level
cloud services, for example Heroku is a PaaS built on
Amazon’s EC2, above which SaaS offerings can be built
(e.g. the LIFX smart lightbulb cloud service on top of
the Heroku platform). From the start, protection was
a paramount concern for the cloud as infrastructure
is shared between tenants. Strong tenant isolation was
provided by means of totally separated virtual machines
(VMs) [1], [2] and more recently, isolated containers have
been provided that share a common OS kernel [3].
Increasingly, cloud-hosted applications may need not
only protection (and isolation) from other applications
but also have requirements for flexible data sharing, often
across VM and container boundaries. An example is the
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UK GCloud1 initiative, a government platform designed
to encourage small companies to provide cloud-hosted
applications. These applications need to be composed
and made to interoperate to support citizens’ needs for
online services. Similarly, the Massachusetts Open Cloud
[4] is a marketplace (Open Cloud Exchange (OCX)) to
encourage small business development. Solutions are
open and one may build on the services of another. The
aim is to create a catalyst for the economic development
of business clusters.
End-users of cloud services still need to be assured
that their data is protected from leakage to other parties
by their cloud hosts, due to software bugs or mis-
configurations, also safeguarded to the extent possible
against insider attacks and external threats. But increas-
ingly, they also need to be able to access their own
data across applications and to share their data with
others, according to the policies they specify. Contain-
ment mechanisms, such as VMs and containers, provide
strong isolation between applications, but do not support
these sharing requirements. The incorporation of cloud
services within ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) architectures [5]
is another driver of the requirement for both protection
and cross-application data sharing, given these IoT ar-
chitectures’ strong emphasis on (safe) interaction. For
example, a patient being monitored at home may store
sensor-gathered medical data in the cloud and share it
1. https://www.gov.uk/digital-marketplace
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2with selected carers, medical practitioners, and medical
research (big-data) repositories, via cloud-hosted and
mediated services. Once data has left end-users’ homes
for cloud services, they need to be assured that it is only
accessed as they specify.
Traditional access control tends to be principal/role
specific, and apply only within the context of a partic-
ular application/service. Controls are applied at policy
enforcement points, after which there is no subsequent
control over where data flows. Once data has left the
direct control of its owner, for example, after being
shared with others, it is difficult using traditional access
controls to ensure and demonstrate that it is not leaked.
If a leak is suspected, it often cannot be established
whether this is a breach of confidentiality by a person or
due to buggy or misconfigured cloud service software.
Encryption offers protection by restricting access to
intelligible data, even beyond the boundary of one’s
technical control. However, encryption hinders flexible,
nuanced data sharing, in that key management (dis-
tribution, revocation) is difficult. Further, traceability is
limited, as being mathematically based there is generally
no feedback as to when/where decryption occurs; and
a compromised key or broken encryption scheme at any
time in the future places data at risk. As such, it is
important that data flows are managed and audited,
even if data items are encrypted.
Although contracts exist between cloud providers and
tenants, and cloud services are increasingly subject to
regulation [6], there is at present no way to establish that
providers remain in compliance with these agreements
and requirements. Also, there are often requirements
that data should pass through certain processes, e.g.,
encryption or anonymisation. There is currently no clear
mechanism to express such requirements and demon-
strate they have been consistently enforced.
An approach to maintaining the association of data
with policy is to use “sticky policies” [7]. Here, owner-
specified management constraints are attached to en-
crypted data. Decryption is only allowed by parties ac-
cepting the management constraints and able to enforce
them. This forms the basis for establishing contractual
relationships between data owners and service providers
or other applications. However, this approach requires
trust in a (relatively large amount of) software. Further,
the enforcement is either at too coarse a granularity or
prohibitively expensive. This is further explored in §2.4.
As an alternative, Information Flow Control (IFC)
augments traditional access control by offering contin-
uous, system-wide, end-to-end flow control based on
properties of the data—for example, “medical data may
only be used for research purposes after going through
consent checking and anonymisation”. IFC allows secu-
rity contexts to be defined system-wide and guarantees
non-interference between them. This is achieved by tags
applied to entities (e.g., processes, files, database en-
tries), inseparable from the entities they are associated
with. Every exchange of data between entities is verified
against security-context-domain relationships created by
the tags, thus allowing tight control over any subsequent
transfers of the data.
In this paper we present CamFlow (Cambridge Flow
Control Architecture). We outline CamFlow’s IFC model
and implementation which comprises a new operating
system (OS) level implementation of IFC as a Linux
Security Module (LSM), with support for application
management, together with an IFC-enabled middleware.
IFC tags are checked on OS system calls and on mes-
sage passing by the middleware, to determine whether
data flows are permissible. Log records can be made
efficiently of all attempted flows, whether permitted
or rejected, and this log provides a possible basis for
audit, data provenance and compliance checking. By this
means it can be checked whether application level policy
has been enforced and whether cloud service provision
has complied with contractual obligations.
We argue that incorporating IFC into the underlying
PaaS-provided OSs, as a small, trusted computing base
would greatly enhance the trustworthiness of cloud
services, whether public or private, and hence all their
hosted services/applications. Our evaluation shows that
IFC would incur acceptable overhead and our IFC
model is designed to ensure that application developers
need not be aware of IFC, although some application
providers may wish to take explicit advantage of IFC.
We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach via an
IFC-enabled framework for web services, see §7.
Contributions: Our main contribution is to demonstrate
the feasibility of providing IFC as part of cloud software
infrastructure and showing how IFC can be made to
work end-to-end, system-wide. In addition to discussing
the ’big picture’, in this paper we also present a new
kernel implementation of IFC and a new audit function.
Our approach enables: (1) protection of applications
from each other (non-interference); (2) flexible, managed
data sharing across isolation boundaries; (3) prevention
of data leakage due to bugs/misconfigurations; (4) ex-
tension of access control beyond application boundaries;
(5) increased transparency, through detailed logs of in-
formation flow decisions.
§2 gives background in protection and IFC, then §3
presents the essentials of the CamFlow IFC model, with
examples. §4 and §5 describe our new OS-level im-
plementation of IFC as a LSM and its integration via
trusted processes with an IFC-enabled middleware, stor-
age services, etc. §6 emphasises that audit in IFC systems
produces logs capable of being processed by ‘big-data’
analytics tools. Audit is central to establishing prove-
nance and for providers to demonstrate compliance with
contract and regulation. §7 shows how standard web
services are supported transparently by the CamFlow
architecture: only a privileged application management
framework need be aware of IFC and unprivileged
application instances can run unchanged. In all cases,
evaluation is included within the section. §8 summarises,
concludes and suggests future work.
32 BACKGROUND
We first define the scope of current isolation mech-
anisms, highlighting the need for flexible data shar-
ing at application-level granularity, i.e. where applications
manage their own security concerns, as well as strong
isolation between tenants and/or applications. As an
introduction to IFC we outline the evolution of IFC
models. Related work on IFC implementation at the OS
level and within distributed systems is given with the
relevant sections. We end with a brief comparison of IFC
with taint tracking (TT) and sticky policies.
2.1 IFC Models
In 1976, Denning [8] proposed a Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) model to track and enforce rules on
information flow in computer systems. In this model,
entities are associated with security classes. The flow of
information from an entity a to an entity b is allowed
only if the security class of b (denoted b) is equal to or
higher than a. This allows the no-read up, no-write down
principle of Bell and LaPadula [9] to be implemented
to enforce secrecy. By this means a traditional military
classification public, secret, top secret can be implemented.
A second security class can be associated with each
entity to track and enforce integrity (quality of data);
no read down, no write up, as proposed by Biba [10]. A
current example might allow input of information from
a government website in the .gov.uk domain but forbid
that from “Joe’s Blog”. Using this model we are able
to control and monitor information flow to ensure data
secrecy and integrity.
In 1997 Myers [11] introduced a Decentralised IFC
model (DIFC) that has inspired most later work. This
model was designed to meet the changing needs of
systems from global, static, hierarchical security levels
to a more flexible system, able to capture the needs
of different applications. In this model each entity is
associated with two labels: a secrecy label and an integrity
label, to capture respectively the privacy/confidentiality
of the data and the reliability of a source of data. Each
label comprises a set of tags, each of which represents
some security concern. Data is allowed to flow if the
security label of the sender is a subset of the label of the
receiver, and conversely for integrity.
Implementations of a decentralised model akin to
Myers’ include a sensitive embedded system for BMW
cars [12] and XBook [13] in a social media context.
Our own model is described in §3. When implemented
from the OS kernel level, applications running under
IFC enforcement do not need to be trusted for the data
management policy to be properly enforced [14].
2.2 Protection via VMs and Containers
Isolation of tenants in cloud platforms is through
hypervisor-supported virtual machines [1], [2] or OS-
provided containers [3]. However, flexible sharing mech-
anisms are also required to manage data exchange be-
tween applications contributing to more complex sys-
tems, or to achieve end-user goals. For example, gov-
ernment applications might access citizens’ records for
various purposes; a user’s data from different applica-
tions might together contribute to evidence related to
health or wellbeing.
At present, the sharing of information between appli-
cations tends to involve a binary decision (i.e. to share
or not), as for example in Google pods (containers).2
Whole resources can be shared, but no control over data
usage between applications is provided. Furthermore,
there are no means for preventing leakage outside of
the mechanisms implemented by the individual appli-
cations/services.
Solutions have been proposed to provide intra-
application sandboxes (down to individual end-users)
[15], but such schemes are difficult to scale, require
changes in application logic, and still do not provide
control beyond isolation boundaries (i.e. again, loss of
control once the data is shared).
IFC has been proposed to guarantee the proper usage
of data by social network applications [13]. The aim is to
provide purpose-based disclosure via IFC [16] between
isolated components, thus guaranteeing that shared data
can only be used for a well-defined and agreed-upon
purpose.
IFC is by no means proposed as a replacement for
access control, VMs or containers, but rather as a com-
plement to those techniques to provide flexible, managed
data-sharing. IFC would allow tenants and end-users to
maintain control (within an IFC-enforcing world) and
define policy applying to their data consistently and
beyond isolation and application borders.
2.3 Taint Tracking (TT) Systems
Runtime, dynamic TT is similar to IFC but with less func-
tionality. TT systems use one tag type “taint” instead of
secrecy and integrity tags. Tags propagate with data and
data flows may be logged. An entity that inputs tagged
data acquires the data’s tag(s). Data flow constraints
are only enforced at specified sink points, for example,
when data attempts to leave a mobile phone [17]. Policy
is applied at sink points such as preventing private,
unanonymised or unencrypted data from flowing, or
strictly controlling to where data may flow.
An example of TT used for integrity purposes is to
taint data from untrusted sources, e.g., user input from
a TCP stream in a web application environment, and
enforce that it is sanitised before being processed [18].
This simple mechanism prevents injection attacks that
plague badly designed web applications. An example of
TT used for confidentiality purposes is to taint sensitive
information, e.g., a list of contacts in a mobile phone, and
track it through this closed system [17]. Data leaving the
system (i.e. the phone) is analysed to ensure it does not
contain sensitive information. Data containing sensitive
information should only leave to a number of closely
2. https://cloud.google.com/container-engine/docs/pods/
4controlled destinations, such as the cloud backup contact
list. This approach aids the detection of malicious ap-
plications attempting to steal user-sensitive information
and send it to third parties. Equally, this type of concern
can be captured through the use of IFC policies.
One concern with TT systems is that there is a gap in
time between the occurrence of the issue (e.g. a leak, an
attack) and when it is detected [19] i.e. problems become
evident only when the tainted data reaches a sink (en-
forcement point). Depending on the degree of isolation
between the different parts of the system, and the num-
ber of system components involved, this tainted data
may have ‘contaminated’ much of the system. While
this can be managed in smaller, closed environments,
it is less appropriate for cloud services in general. IFC
policies present the clear advantage to prevent problems
as they occur and to stop their effects propagating to a
potentially large part of the system.
Some argue that TT is simpler to use than IFC, and
incurs lower overhead, but when the enforcement is
systemic and the granularity identical the overheads
are similar (compare [17] and the evaluation in §4 and
§5). Indeed, the complexity of verifying IFC policy (see
§3) is comparable to the cost of propagating taint. For
both techniques, most of the overhead comes from the
mechanism for intercepting data exchange.
2.4 Sticky Policies
IFC can be seen as a mechanism for enforcing policy;
the labels associated with entities represent application
policies. IFC is a simple, low-level mechanism. Sticky
policy approaches also consider the enforcement of data-
bound policy, but at a higher-level.
Casassa-Mont et al. [20] first introduced sticky policies,
which involves encrypting data along with a list of poli-
cies to be enforced on that data. To obtain the decryption
key from a Trusted Authority (TA), a party must agree to
enforce the policies associated with the data. This agree-
ment may be considered as part of forming a contractual
link between the data owner and the service provider.
Work has continued in the area [21]–[23]. Sticky policies,
typically enforced at the application-level, are generally
more complex and heavyweight than the simple secrecy
and integrity constraints of IFC. As such, sticky policies
tend only to be enforced at particular points, e.g. at
administrative boundaries. IFC on the other hand, as
we show in §4.1.2, can be enforced continuously at a
reasonable cost. In §3, we discuss how complex policies
might be built from IFC labels.
Further, the sticky policy approach builds upon the
trust established between the data owner, the TAs and
services that use the data. A non-compliant service could
be black-listed, but only if and when a breach of agree-
ment is detected and the TA updated. Our IFC approach
builds only upon the trust between the data owner and
the cloud provider. Services and applications running on
top of the cloud provider platform need not be trusted.
We believe this to be a great improvement to the overall
Alice Record
S(A) = {alice,medical}
I(A) = {hosp.-dev., consent}
Bob Record
S(B) = {bob,medical}
I(B) = {hosp.-dev., consent}
Alice’s app. instance
S(C) = {alice,medical}
I(C) = {consent}Allowed Flow
Prevented Flow
Fig. 1: An allowed safe flow and prevented flows.
trustworthiness of the system.
3 CAMFLOW-MODEL: IFC FOR THE CLOUD
IFC operates to ensure that only permitted flows of
information can occur, by enforcing data flow policy dy-
namically, end-to-end, within and across applications/
services. Entities to which IFC constraints are applied
can include a MapReduce worker instance [24], a file, a
process, a database entry [25], etc. In CamFlow, IFC is ap-
plied continuously, typically on every system call for an
IFC-enabled OS, and on communication mechanisms for
enforcement across applications/runtime environments.
IFC policy should therefore be as simple as possible,
to allow verification, human understanding and to min-
imise runtime overhead. Indeed, there is no need for IFC
to encapsulate every possible policy; rather, it augments
other control mechanisms, and can help enforce their
policies.
3.1 Tags and Labels
We define tags that are tokens, each representing some
security concern over secrecy or integrity. The tag
bob-private could for example represent Bob’s personal
data. We associate every entity in the system with two
labels (sets of tags): an entity A has a secrecy label S(A)
and an integrity label I(A). The state of these labels is
the security context of the entity. The power of IFC is that
it guarantees non-interference between security contexts
[26], [27].
Example – secrecy: Suppose a patient, Bob is discharged
from hospital to be medically monitored at home. The
data streams from his sensors are transferred to a cloud
service and are to be shared with his medical team at
the hospital. The data items from his devices are tagged
with medical, bob in their secrecy labels.
Example – integrity: The cloud-based home monitoring
support service needs to be assured that the data it
receives is from a hospital-issued device. Each sensing
device is checked and issued with the tag hospital-device
in its integrity label.
Fig. 1 illustrates information flow constraints being
applied over both secrecy and integrity dimensions.
3.2 Decentralised Privileges and Security Contexts
In decentralised IFC (DIFC) any active entity can create
new tags. Tag creation is typically carried out by appli-
cation managers when setting up application instances.
When an active entity creates a new tag either for secrecy
or integrity, this process is given the corresponding
privilege to add and remove the tag to its secrecy or
integrity label respectively. If an active entity A has a
5Medical Record
S = {personal}
I = ∅
Consent Checker
S = {personal}
I = {cons.}
Anonymiser
S = {research}
I = {cons., anon.}
Research Database
S = {research}
I = {cons., anon.}
Researcher Portal
S = {research}
I = {cons., anon.}Allowed Flow
Prevented Flow
Research Project XXNHS Cloud S = {personal}
I = ∅
S = {personal}
I = {cons.}
Context change
Fig. 2: Medical data declassified and endorsed for research purposes.
privilege to add t to its secrecy label, we denote this
t ∈ P+S (A), and to remove t from its secrecy label:
t ∈ P−S (A) (and similarly P+I (A) and P−I (A) are the priv-
ileges for integrity). An active entity may therefore have
four privilege sets in addition to its security context.
Application managers will normally set up application
instances in security contexts, without the privileges to
change them. An example is given in §7.
3.3 Creating a New Entity
We define A ⇒ B as the operation of the entity A
creating the entity B. An example is creating a process
in a Unix-style OS by clone. We have the following rules
for creation:
if A⇒ B, then
{
S(B) := S(A)
I(B) := I(A)
That is, the created entity inherits the security context
of its creator. These rules force the creating entity to
explicitly change its security context to that required for
the entity to be created. We motivate this below in §3.4.2.
Note that only labels pass to the created entity; privileges
have to be passed explicitly.
3.4 Security
The purpose of IFC models is to regulate flows between
entities, and effect label changes and privilege delega-
tion.
Definition 1. A system is secure in the CamFlow IFC model
if and only if all allowed messages are safe (Definition 2), all
allowed label changes are safe (Definition 3) and all privilege
delegation is safe (Definitions 4 and 5).
3.4.1 Information Exchange
IFC prevents data leakage by controlling the exchange
of information. We follow the classic pattern for IFC-
guaranteed secrecy (no read up, no write down [9]) and
integrity (no read down, no write up [10]).
Definition 2. A flow of information A → B is safe if and
only if:
A→ B, iff {S(A) ⊆ S(B) ∧ I(B) ⊆ I(A)}
Example – secrecy enforcement: Consider our exam-
ple of patient monitoring after discharge from hospital,
where the patient’s devices are tagged with medical, bob
in their secrecy labels. In order for the cloud service to
be able to receive this data it must also include the tags
medical, bob in its secrecy label. Therefore an application
instance accessing Bob’s medical data must be labelled as
such. In §7 we describe how applications can be designed
to meet such requirements.
Example – integrity enforcement: The cloud-based
home monitoring support service needs to be assured
that the data it receives is from a hospital-issued de-
vice. To achieve this, the service has an integrity tag
hospital-issued in its integrity label and will only accept
data from devices with tags hospital-issued.
3.4.2 Label Change
Under the above constraints, information flows are
restricted to equal or increasing secrecy constraints
and equal or decreasing integrity constraints. However,
data may undergo transformations and/or checks that
change its security properties. For example, moving data
through an anonymisation engine renders the data less
sensitive, so less strict secrecy constraints can apply
to the anonymised output. In the integrity dimension,
data may go through a validation process on input,
thus becoming more trustworthy. In CamFlow only the
process itself is able to change its secrecy and integrity
labels, which requires the appropriate privileges and
must be explicitly requested.
Definition 3. A label change noted A  A′ is safe if and
only if for a label X (either S or I) and a tag t:
X(A′) := X(A) ∪ {t} if t ∈ P+X (A)
OR
X(A′) := X(A) \ {t} if t ∈ P−X (A)
Declassifiers and endorsers are the entities with the
privileges to perform security context transformations.
Declassifiers change the secrecy properties and endorsers
change the integrity properties.
Example – declassification: A medical record system
is held in a private cloud. Research datasets may be
created from these records, but only from records where
the patients have given consent. Also, only anonymised
6data may leave the private protected environment. We
assume a health service approved anonymisation proce-
dure. Fig. 2 shows the anonymiser inputting data tagged
as personal and declassifying the data by outputting data
with secrecy tag research.
Example – endorsement: In the same example, the
Research Database is on a public cloud and may only
receive research data tagged with consent, anon in its
integrity label. In the private cloud we see a pro-
cess that selects appropriate records for specific re-
search purposes, checks for patient consent and adds
the tag consent to the integrity label of its output. The
anonymiser process can only input data with this tag; it
anonymises the data and outputs data with the tag anon
in its integrity label.
Some previous work [14], [28] allows implicit declas-
sification and endorsement. That is, if an active entity has
the privilege to declassify/endorse and the privilege
to return to its original state (i.e. for declassification/
endorsement over t the entity has privilege t− and t+),
the declassification/endorsement may occur implicitly
without the need for the entity to make the label changes.
We believe that this could in practice lead to unintentional
data disclosure. Suppose an entity has the privilege to
declassify top-secret information. The requirement for
explicit label change makes it unlikely that the entity will
send such data accidentally to an unintended recipient.
Our model has stronger constraints that require endorse-
ment and declassification operations to be programmed
explicitly.
3.4.3 Privilege delegation
An entity is only able to delegate a privilege it owns.
Definition 4. A privilege delegation is safe if and only if
t ∈ P±X (A).
3.5 Conflict of Interest
In CamFlow alone among IFC systems, privilege dele-
gation is further restricted by Conflict of Interest (CoI)
(or Separation of Duty (SoD)) enforcement. The receiving
entity A, must not be put in a situation where it would
break a CoI constraint. By this means, an application
manager is prevented from creating an application in-
stance with access to conflicting data.
Definition 5. An entity A does not violate a CoI C if and
only if:∣∣∣(S(A) ∪ I(A) ∪ P+S (A) ∪ P+I (A) ∪ P−S (A) ∪ P−I (A)) ∩ C∣∣∣ ≤ 1
Example – conflict of interest: A CoI might arise when
data relating to competing companies is available in a
system. In a hospital context, this might involve the
results of analysis of the usage and effects of drugs from
competing pharmaceutical companies. The companies
might agree to this analysis only if their data is guar-
anteed to be isolated, i.e. not leaked to other companies.
The hospital may be participating in drug trials and
want to ensure that information does not leak between
Camflow-LSM
IFC Library
User Space
Kernel Space
Application Process
Kernel
DIFC Management APISystem Calls
Hardware
IFC LibraryTrusted Process
Authorise and Audit
Fig. 3: The interactions of the IFC Security Module (LSM)
and a Trusted Process within an OS.
trials: suppose a conflict is C = {Pfizer,GSK,Roche, ...}
and some data (e.g. files) are labelled PfizerData[S =
{Pfizer}, I = ∅] and RocheData[S = {Roche}, I = ∅]. The
CoI described ensures that it is not possible for a single
entity (e.g. an application instance) to have access to
both RocheData and PfizerData either simultaneously or
sequentially, i.e. enforcing that Roche-owned data and
Pfizer-owned data are processed in isolation.
The next sections describe the CamFlow platform that
enforces the IFC constraints described.
4 OS ENFORCEMENT
At the heart of the architecture is a minimal kernel mod-
ule dedicated solely to OS-level IFC enforcement. The
module is trusted to enforce IFC, transparently, across
all flows between entities within the OS. User space
processes can directly interact with the kernel module,
e.g. to delegate privileges (§3.4) through a pseudo-file
system, abstracted through a high level API. Higher level
considerations and policies can be managed through
specifically defined Trusted Processes (see §4.2). The local
machine architecture is represented in Fig. 3.
Note that IFC operates alongside and complements
other security technologies. It is not a cloud security
panacea; challenges regarding covert and side channels,
and direct access to hardware by an attacker remain, as
they do for systems in general. There are approaches
that can help address these security threats, but many
are highly disruptive (e.g. synchronisation approaches
to reducing timing channels) and are infrequently used.
Other threats may be easier to mitigate and solutions
may be used when appropriate (e.g. on-disk encryption).
4.1 CamFlow-LSM
Our kernel module, CamFlow-LSM, is implemented as a
Linux Security Module (LSM) [29]. Although our work is
Linux-specific, a similar approach could be used on any
system providing LSM-like security hooks. Unlike other
DIFC OS implementations [14], [28] our kernel patch is
self-contained, strictly limited to the security module,
does not modify any existing system calls and follows
LSM implementation best practice. This allows, among
other things, LSM stacking [30], [31] and coexistence
with other security modules such as e.g. SELinux [32]
or AppArmor [33] and complements their MAC enforce-
ment with decentralised information flow policies.
We assume that the rest of the kernel can be trusted
and does not interfere with the IFC enforcement mech-
anism. LSM system hooks have been statically and
dynamically verified [34]–[36], and our implementation
7inherits from LSM the formal assurance of IFC’s correct
placement on the path to any controlled kernel object.
This is sufficient to guarantee that we control flow and
record audit on any operation on a controlled kernel
object.
Since applications running on SELinux [32] or Ap-
pArmor [33] need not be aware of the MAC policy
being enforced, we see no reason to force applications
running on an IFC system to be aware of IFC; only those
performing declassification or endorsement operations
are necessarily aware. This implementation choice is
important; cloud providers can incorporate IFC without
requiring changes in the software deployed by ten-
ants. Alternatively, applications that wish to manage
their own IFC constraints can declare policy through a
pseudo-filesystem (as is typical for LSMs) abstracted by
a user space library and enforced transparently by the
IFC mechanism.
The LSM framework calls security hooks when access
to a kernel object is attempted. Security metadata can be
associated with kernel objects and is used by the LSM
module to make access decisions. Tags and privileges
are represented by 64-bit opaque nonces associated with
kernel objects such as processes, inodes, files, shared
memory objects, messages etc. On interaction between
kernel objects, CamFlow-LSM security hooks are called
to enforce data-flow policy (§3.4.1) or propagate tags on
entity creation (§3.3) as appropriate.
Only active entities (processes) have mutable labels
and privileges, all other (passive) entities have im-
mutable labels and no privileges.
Privileges are allocated by the kernel and owned by
the creating process (any process can create tags and the
associated privileges in a decentralised fashion). Privi-
leges can be passed to other processes, users or groups,
CamFlow-LSM verifying that constraints on privilege
delegation (§3.4.3) and conflict of interest (§3.5) are not
violated. A process can add or remove a tag from its
label if it owns the appropriate privilege (following IFC
constraints described in §3.4.2), if the current user owns
the privilege or if the current group owns the privilege.
How tags are shared and managed must be considered
with care when designing an application and the system
must be administered accordingly.
4.1.1 Checkpointing and Restoration
Checkpointing a process involves halting its execution,
allowing it to be restarted at a later stage, and enabling
migration, e.g. [37]. LSM state is normally saved and
restored by the checkpointing system, e.g. [38], and
our module further exports an API to more efficiently
serialise and restore security context.
Furthermore, self-checkpointing and restoring the pre-
vious state of a process, has been demonstrated [39] to be
a beneficial feature for IFC systems. This is particularly
useful for processes serving requests. In such a scenario
the state of the process is saved after initialisation. When
a request is received, the serving process sets itself up
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Fig. 4: Overhead introduced into the OS by CamFlow
LSM (x-axis time in µs).
in the security context appropriate to serve the request.
After the request is served (or a series of requests if the
system is session-based as described in §7), the process
restores its memory state and security context to what
they were immediately after initialisation. This improves
performance and prevents data leaks between security
contexts.
4.1.2 OS Evaluation
We tested the CamFlow-LSM module on Linux Kernel
version 3.17.8 (01/2015) from the Fedora distribution.3
The tests are run on an Intel 2.2Ghz i7 CPU and 6GiB
RAM machine.
Measurements are done using the Linux tool ftrace [40]
to provide a microbenchmark. Two processes read from
and write to a pipe respectively. Each has 20 tags in its
security label, substantially more than we have seen a
need for in current use cases. We measure the overhead
induced by: creating a new process (sys clone), creating
a new pipe (sys pipe), writing to the pipe (sys write) and
reading from the pipe (sys read). The results are given
in Fig. 4.
We can distinguish two types of induced overhead:
verifying an IFC constraint (sys read, sys write) and allo-
cating labels (sys clone, sys pipe). The sys clone overhead
is roughly twice that of sys pipe as memory is allocated
dynamically for the active entity’s labels and privileges.
Recall that passive entities have no privileges. Overhead
measurements for other system calls/data structures are
essentially identical as they rely on the same underlying
enforcement mechanism, and are not included.
The CamFlow-LSM overhead is a few percent, see
Fig. 4. We provide a build option that further improves
performance by declaring labels and privileges with a
fixed maximum size (by default, label size can increase
dynamically to meet application requirements). This re-
duces the overhead of the system calls that create new
entities (the dynamic label component in Fig. 4). This is
an acceptable trade-off as in practical scenarios, labels
rarely exceed more than five tags. However, for most
applications, the overhead is imperceptible and lost in
system noise; it is hard to measure without using kernel
3. It is not feasible to provide a comparison with the Laminar
implementation [28], that is closest in technical terms to our work,
as the implementation available https://github.com/ut-osa/laminar
is for an obsolete kernel version 2.6.22 (07/2007).
8tools, as the variation between two executions may be
greater than the overhead.
4.2 Trusted Processes
The CamFlow-LSM is trusted to enforce IFC at the kernel
level. Its functionality is minimal; strictly confined to
the enforcement of IFC policies as described in §3. This
guarantees easier maintainability and a system that is
agnostic to higher level application requirements, thus
minimising the constraints imposed on user-space ap-
plication design.
We introduce the concept of a trusted process, that al-
lows application/platform-specific concerns to be man-
aged in user space by bypassing some LSM-enforced IFC
constraints. For example, a trusted process might serve
as a proxy for external connections, as in the Trusted IFC
Gateway in the example in §7, setting up and managing
application components’ labels. Trusted processes are
used to interact with persistent storage (see §5.3), for
checkpointing and restoring processes (see §4.1.1) and
for managing inter-process and external communication
(see §5).
Fig. 5 shows OS instances running the CamFlow-
LSM hosting a number of application processes, that
may be grouped in containers. Each OS instance has
a single trusted process (Security Context Manager) to
manage its hosted processes’ IFC labels and privileges. In
addition, each process has an associated trusted middle-
ware process to handle inter-process and inter-machine
communication. Such communication may be within or
between containers, OSs or clouds.
In this example, S represents a particular set of secrecy
tags, and I a particular set of integrity tags, both of
which remain the same throughout. The application pro-
cesses and other OS objects, such as pipes and files, are
labelled [S, I]. The process labelled [∅, I] writes ‘public’
data to a pipe, which is read by a process labelled [S, I],
assuming all the I tags match correctly. Similarly, two
processes are shown writing to and reading from a file.
The Security Context Manager maps between the
kernel-level representation of tags (as 64-bit integers)
and the representation of tags in user space. Within a
cloud or other trusted environment, tags may be simple
strings. When tags need to cross domain boundaries,
e.g., when cloud services form part of a wider archi-
tecture, as in IoT, tags may need to be protected by
cryptographic means (see §5.1).
Trusted processes are either set up through static
configuration, read at boot time by the CamFlow-LSM
module, or created at runtime by another trusted pro-
cess. Trusted processes must either be managed by a
trusted party (in our current approach the underlying in-
frastructure provider) and/or the code must be auditable
and a means to verify the current version running on the
platform must be provided (see §4.3).
4.3 Leveraging Hardware Roots of Trust
Incorporating IFC into cloud-provider OSs would en-
hance the trustworthiness of the platform. However,
IFC only guarantees protection above the technical layer
in which it is enforced. Recent hardware and software
developments make it possible to attest that the software
layers on which our platform runs have been audited.
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [41], as used for
remote attestation [42], is one such hardware mecha-
nism. TPM is used to generate a nearly unforgeable
hash representing the state of the hardware and soft-
ware of a given platform, that can be remotely verified.
Therefore, a company could audit the implementation
of our IFC enforcement mechanism and ensure that our
kernel security module, messaging middleware and the
configuration they provide are indeed running on the
platform. Any difference between the expected state of
the software stack and the platform could be considered
a breach of trust; such considerations can easily be
embedded in the contractual obligations of the cloud
provider.
TPM and remote attestation for cloud computing [43]
are reaching maturity, with IBM rolling out an open
source, scalable trusted platform based on virtual TPMs
[44]. Indeed, Berger et al. [44] describe a mechanism
allowing the TPM and remote attestation to be provided
for virtual machine offerings and container-based solu-
tions, covering the whole range of contemporary cloud
offerings. Furthermore, the approach not only allows the
state of the software stack to be verified at boot time, but
also during execution, and can thus prevent run-time
modification of the system configuration.
5 CROSS-MACHINE ENFORCEMENT
CamFlow-LSM operates to protect flows within the OS.
However, it is also important that flows are protected
across OS instances.
Generally, in order to guarantee flow constraints, only
processes P such that S(P ) = ∅ and I(P ) = ∅, i.e. not
subject to IFC constraints, are allowed to directly connect
to or receive messages from connections on remote OS
(e.g. through a socket). In order to connect to another
machine, a process must either: 1) be able to declassify
to change its security context to S(P ) = ∅ and I(P ) = ∅;
2) communicate through an intermediate trusted process.
As such, CamFlow contains an IFC-enabled, fully-
featured messaging middleware (CamFlow-MW) to both
facilitate communication and guarantee enforcement
across machines. For want of space, we only consider
the middleware concepts relevant to IFC; details on the
general middleware (as it was prior to IFC/CamFlow
integration) can be found in [45]. In short, the middle-
ware supports strongly-typed messages; a range of in-
teraction paradigms, including request-reply, broadcast,
and streams; flexible resource discovery; and security
mechanisms including access controls and encrypted
communication. A particular feature is its support for
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dynamic reconfiguration based on event-driven policy.
This simplifies both application development and de-
ployment, as concerns can be abstracted and tailored
to the particular environment, rather than embedded
within application code.
The role of the middleware is to move towards contin-
uous, end-to-end data flow management, such that IFC
can be enforced across applications/machines (kernels).
There is work on IFC enforcement across machines;
however, these impose specific requirements, such as
design-time considerations [46], a particular language/
runtime [47], or constraints on system architecture/
implementation [48]. In contrast, we integrate IFC func-
tionality into the general, fully featured distributed sys-
tems middleware mentioned above (see [49]), to provide
flexibility and be more generally applicable. We delib-
erately avoid imposing a structure on system design,
instead integrating IFC functionality into the sort of com-
munications infrastructure common to current enterprise
and cloud systems.
5.1 Remote Interactions
CamFlow-MW operates by associating a trusted process
(see §4.2) with an entity that seeks to communicate via
the messaging system. Its fit within the broader architec-
ture is depicted in Fig. 5. The process is responsible for
handling the communication of messages, and enforces
IFC based on the current runtime labels of the entity on
whose behalf it operates.
It follows that for IFC to be enforced across machines,
tags require system-wide management, i.e. throughout
the cloud service. In [50] we proposed that the widely
used and available X.509 certificates could be used. The
approach relies on public key certificates and attribute
certificates [51], to respectively identify the application
associated with the CamFlow-MW instance and the tags
associated with this application.
As part of establishing a connection, CamFlow-MW
ensures that each entity authorises communication with
the other, according to a local access control policy. De-
cisions are based on component metadata, the relevant
authentication aspects secured through PKI (certificates).
Similarly, IFC policy must also be verified to ensure data
flows are authorised according to IFC policy. Attribute
certificates provide cryptographic means to determine
and verify the tags associated with the remote entity
(see [50]), on which policy can be enforced. If tags do
not accord, the connection will not be established.
We also see potential for remote attestation, based on
hardware integrity measures (see §4.3), to be integrated
into this authorisation phase, to ensure the remote ma-
chine operates a reliable IFC enforcement regime.
5.2 Message-Level Enforcement
CamFlow messages are strongly typed, where a mes-
sage type is defined by a schema describing its set of
attributes. For an instance of a message, an attribute
consists of a name, type and value. The support for
IFC within messages is fine-grained, in that individual
attributes within messages can also be labelled. These
attribute labels introduce additional IFC constraints over
and above those already applying to the entity, i.e. as
recognised by the kernel-LSM, and validated on connec-
tion establishment.
Labels can be defined within message type schema,
which sets the attributes’ IFC labels for all message
instances of the type. These labels cannot be changed by
entities dealing in such messages, and the entities must
hold the requisite labels to interact with the attributes.
Otherwise, the entity producing/publishing a message
can set the security labels for the attributes (for those not
predefined), if the entity holds the associated privileges.
Enforcement occurs as follows:
Receiving: If the receiving entity’s labels do not agree
with those of an attribute value, the attribute value (and
any sub-attributes) are removed from (made null in) the
message. This is enforced on message receipt, before it
is delivered to the entity.
Sending: An entity cannot send values for attributes
where its labels do not agree with those of the attribute.
This is enforced when an entity attempts to send a
message, ensuring values for any attributes violating this
policy are removed, before message propagation.
Enforcement is automatic, meaning that applications
using the messaging system can be subject to IFC en-
forcement completely transparently (i.e. without their di-
rect involvement); though again, there is the interface for
the application to actively manage IFC where required.
In addition, the general reconfiguration capabilities of
the middleware enable connections between components
to be defined and managed at runtime, providing an-
other mechanism for controlling communication [45].
10
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Time in ms.IFC-overhead
Fig. 6: IFC overhead of CamFlow-MW for a workload
transmission of 5000 messages (x-axis in ms)
5.3 Integrating With Persistent Storage
One technique to provide IFC with persistent data stores,
is to store the tags alongside the data, and a trusted
software component ensures that when information is
read from the store, the corresponding labels are applied.
In Flume [14], a trusted process provides the interface
between untrusted applications and persistent storage.
More recent work has seen the emergence of databases
that natively understand IFC concepts and can enforce
IFC policies [25].
We see much promise in having the middleware me-
diate between persistence systems and the kernel, to
ensure consistent IFC application.
5.4 Evaluation
As shown in Fig. 6, the results indicate that IFC en-
forcement introduces an overhead of ∼13% in perfor-
mance time compared to the standard, non IFC-enabled
middleware (see [49] for details). Note that these results
were measured in the context of a particular workload,
deliberately designed to highlight the impact of IFC
enforcement. It follows that the overheads associated
with real-world usage are most likely less onerous.
6 AUDIT: DATA-CENTRIC LOGS
IFC, in addition to providing strong assurances that pol-
icy is being enforced, can also provide a data-centric log
[52] detailing the information flows within and between
system components. In addition to enforcing IFC via our
LSM module we log the data flows of labelled processes,
policy decisions, privileges and IFC security context
manipulations. Equivalent inter-machine operations via
the middleware are also recorded.
Cloud logging systems are generally based on legacy
logging systems (OS, web-server, database etc.) that
either fail to capture the needed information, or are
extremely complicated to interpret in a useful manner
[53]. More importantly, such logs tend to be relevant only
to the particular service or component, which makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to audit across a range of
applications, clouds, etc.
IFC logs, as provided by our platform, allow us to cap-
ture information on application-level data flows, both at-
tempted and permitted, allowing the correct expression
and implementation of data flow policy to be checked.
This provides transparency allows for meaningful audit,
in terms of investigating the circumstances in which data
leakage occurs, and provides evidence of compliance,
e.g. with legal obligations [54].
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6.1 Analysing Paths to Disclosure
To assist in interpreting log information, we build a di-
rected graph corresponding to the allowed flows during
the execution of our system, as shown in Fig. 7. The
flows defined in our IFC model (see §3), namely data
flow, creation flow, security context change and privi-
lege delegation, correspond to the edges of the directed
graph. Entities (such as processes, files, messages etc.)
are represented as nodes in the graph.
In addition to information necessary to build the graph
(as shown in the figure), additional metadata is collected
for forensic purposes, which is context/entity/event-
dependent. These audit entries, provided by the LSM
and middleware, can be exploited by a dedicated service
implemented in user space, connected to the kernel
collection mechanism via relayfs [55]. This service feeds,
for example, a graph visualisation tool such as Cytoscape
[56] or a graph database such as Neo4J.4
Such a directed graph helps one identify data leaks.
For example, a tenant might discover that some sensi-
tive medical data leaked into a data store where only
anonymised research data were supposed to be stored.
IFC is enforced in line with the policy encapsulated in
labels; thus data may leak if such policy is improperly ex-
pressed and/or declassification/endorsement processes
are not correctly implemented (e.g. if the anonymisation
process in Fig. 2 allows re-identification).
Suppose that an information leak is suspected be-
tween different security contexts L1[S, I] and L2[S′, I ′].
Determining whether such a leak can occur is equiv-
alent to discovering whether there is a path in the
graph between the two contexts. If the leak occurred,
there must be a path between some entity Ei such that
S(Ei) = S ∧ I(Ei) = I and another entity Fi such that
S(Fi) = S
′ ∧ I(Fi) = I ′.
The existence of such a path demonstrates that a leak
is possible. To investigate whether a leak occurred, it is
essential to consider the event ID associated with the
edges comprising the path. We denote by ei, the last in-
coming edge to the entity under investigation with labels
[S′, I ′]; only edges such that e < ei should be considered.
When applied to all nodes along a path, this rule ensures
strictly monotonically increasing timestamps from the
first node to the last. Fig. 7 shows in blue/pale a possible
data disclosure path, from file F2, from a very simple
4. http://neo4j.com/
11
audit graph. We know from the event IDs e0 and e1 that
the data disclosure did not occur through file F1 and
process P3, but through P1’s declassification.
6.2 Demonstrating Compliance
Compliance with certain requirements can be demon-
strated through queries over the graph. We assume the
audit data is stored in a graph database that we can
query. For example, the following plain English policy:
“European personal data sent to the US must be anonymised”
[57], is equivalent to writing a query that verifies that
there is no path between EU- and US-labelled data
without an anonymisation process.
The policy “Medical data stored in database X must have
received proper consent and be anonymised” [54] can be
expressed as a query verifying that there is no path be-
tween data labelled as medical and the database, without
consent-checking and anonymiser processes. In addition,
an investigator may want to know which anonymisation
algorithm has been run, which data has been used to
generate the anonymised records etc. Our audit graph
assists in answering such questions.
Note that IFC only applies guarantees with respect
to flows. Demonstrating the overall effectiveness of the
management regime, e.g. the quality and suitability of
the anonymisation algorithm, is out-of-scope for a flow-
based enforcement mechanism.
6.3 Audit as ‘Big Data’
We are potentially generating a vast amount of data in
our IFC logs. However, unlike standard system logs that
are complex to analyse, our logs generate graphs that
are ideal for analysis by “big data” tools that have been
developed for this purpose [58].
Since the amount of data is potentially huge, the
amount of data being logged can be fine-tuned to meet
the requirements of the platform/tenant; e.g. by reduc-
ing the amount of metadata being stored, by logging
only security context changing operations, by logging
only information corresponding to some target security
context, keeping operations on unlabelled entities out-
side of the log etc. The decision on what needs to be
logged then becomes a tradeoff between utility and the
volume (cost) of log generated, which can be decided in
order to correspond to legal or contractual requirements
(for example, a regulated sector may need to have a
fine-grained log to satisfy data forensic requirements).
Indeed, as such an approach is new to the cloud, such
considerations will be refined by experience, with best
practices developing over time.
6.4 Audit Access
Logs can contain sensitive information and access to
them should be controlled. This represents an area of
our ongoing work. Traditional access controls clearly
play a role; however, secrecy tags could also be lever-
aged. For example, an auditor, before being granted
access to audit logs, could be forced to demonstrate
ownership of the corresponding secrecy IFC tags (for
example through cryptographic means as in §5.1). The
auditor may be granted access to a log entry only if
S(origin) ∪ S(destination) ⊆ S(auditor).
7 EXAMPLE: SUPPORT FOR WEB SERVICES
One of the most common uses of PaaS is to host web ap-
plications. In this section we present the implementation
of such a solution built on the infrastructure described in
§4, in order to evaluate and demonstrate the feasibility of
our proposed approach. This is illustrated in Fig. 8. We
run standard and unmodified Ruby web applications.
Interaction with end-users is achieved through a
“gateway” between the IFC and non-IFC worlds. Simi-
larly, interaction with cloud services (such as data stores)
is also achieved through our messaging middleware as
discussed in §5. The requirement for this gateway can
be removed if a trustworthy IFC implementation can be
provided at the client side, consistent with the cloud im-
plementation with respect to tag naming, enforcement,
etc. Tag naming in general, system-wide, is an issue
beyond the scope of this paper, see further §8. In our
proof of concept implementation the gateway is a simple
Apache server running a custom-built module.
The role of the gateway is to authenticate the end-user
when a session is created, and to associate this session
with an application instance running within the security
context corresponding to the user. Recall that a security
context comprises the S and I labels. Any further re-
quests to the gateway in that session are routed to the
corresponding application instance. Once an instance no
longer has an associated session it can be recycled using
self-checkpointing, as described in §4.1.1.
Several application types are running over our cloud-
based, web services platform. For example, in a medical
context these might be medical record editing, pharmacy
ordering, social services etc. A single, shared, identity
service for the end-user is part of the cloud provider
offering (in our proof of concept implementation we
used OAuth [59]).
The GP authenticates, is authorised as treating doc-
tor for Alice and selects the ‘identity’ that corresponds
to Alice. A new session is created server-side by the
gateway, with the requested application instance run-
ning in the corresponding security context, with S =
[medical, alice], I = [∅]. When the GP wants to access
applications on behalf of a new patient, he needs to close
Alice’s session, authorise as treating doctor for Bob and
open a new session for Bob.
The control described above is not achieved by the
application, but by the platform itself and can be con-
trolled by the end-user, subject to access control. That
is, a medical application used on Alice’s behalf runs in
a security context in which data cannot flow to that of
another patient. Furthermore, applications running on
behalf of a given user can share the data of that user
without the risk of seeing a buggy application leaking
data between end-users.
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As described in §4, we assume the middleware and
the OS enforcement are provided as a service by the
underlying platform. A tenant wanting to use the third-
party, web-service offering, once his trust in the under-
lying platform is established, needs only to audit the
gateway; again, the underlying infrastructure provider
could either provide such a gateway or audit it. The
rest of the software stack of the third-party, web-service
provider is bound by the IFC enforcement mechanism
and therefore need not be trusted.
8 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
IFC allows data flows to be controlled continuously
throughout a system, by providing an information-
centric MAC scheme that continuously ensures non-
interference between security contexts. This paper pre-
sented the CamFlow platform, that demonstrates the
potential of cloud-deployed IFC as supporting: (1) pro-
tection of applications from each other; (2) flexible data
sharing across isolation boundaries; (3) prevention of
data leakage due to bugs/misconfigurations; (4) exten-
sion of access control beyond application boundaries; (5)
data flow transparency.
Specifically, we detailed a new kernel implementation
of IFC as an LSM, demonstrating low overhead even
for worst-case scenarios, where processes continuously
make read/write system calls. We also described the
integration of a messaging middleware to enforcing IFC
across machines. This combination makes it possible to
provide whole-system IFC to PaaS cloud services, and
therefore also SaaS. Our approach and implementation
were designed so that applications can run unchanged
over IFC, thus making cloud adoption feasible.
We also indicated how the data-centric logs based on
IFC enforcement could provide the means to audit an
IFC-enabled system, whereby a log can be processed as
a directed graph to investigate leaks and attacks and
show compliance with data management requirements.
Though this represents our initial work in the area, there
appears much promise.
In light of the above, we believe that IFC has great
potential as a security mechanism for the cloud whereby
trust in a few major cloud providers, deploying IFC,
can be built on to provide a demonstrably trustworthy
computing environment.
CamFlow was developed with cloud deployment in
mind. Our future work will investigate the challenges of
a broader distributed context.
It is already feasible to extend CamFlow to sup-
port mobile environments. Android supports the full
SELinux enforcement,5 and an Android-LSM integration
has been demonstrated [60]. But when dealing with
multiple cloud services, particularly as they become part
of a wider distributed architecture such as in the IoT,
a trustworthy, system-wide deployment of IFC can no
longer be assumed. Much work remains on establishing
trust in (and the trustworthiness of) the IFC enforcement
mechanism within end-users’ devices. Outside a cloud
context, all parties’ trust in a common third party’s en-
forcement of IFC constraints, cannot be assumed (unlike
the cloud provider for cloud services). We intend to
explore leveraging hardware roots of trust and remote
attestation to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of
IFC enforcement mechanisms.
Another area of investigation concerns the represen-
tation of tags across administrative domains. In a cloud
context, a federated approach can be envisaged where
a common understanding of tags could be negotiated
across multiple domains. For example, in [54] we dis-
cussed initial thoughts on managing data according to
specific obligation regimes. However, as the number
of administrative domains increases, both a global tag
naming scheme and mechanisms for ad-hoc negotiation
become necessary.
Related is the sensitivity of the tags themselves.
Knowledge of the meaning of a tag can indicate that
the associated entity contains or deals with certain infor-
mation. If a relationship can be established between an
entity and the information owner, this may disclose pri-
vate information about the information owner. This may
lead to work on a need-to-know negotiation mechanism
to establish a secure channel between hosts, especially
in a wide-scale distributed system. A promising mech-
anism is private set intersection to determine tags’ subset
relationship (§3.4.1).
Another challenge concerns extending audit to dis-
tributed architectures, both in terms of resource man-
agement and regulating access to log data.
5. https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/selinux
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